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Summary. Most ﬁnancial asset pricing models assume frictionless, competitive
markets that imply the absence of arbitrage opportunities. Given the absence of ar-
bitrage opportunities and complete asset markets, there exists a unique martingale
measure that implies martingale pricing formulae and replicating asset portfolios.
In incomplete markets, or markets with transaction costs, these results must be
modiﬁed to admit non-unique measures and the possibility of imperfectly replicat-
ing portfolios. Similar diﬃculties arise in markets with taxation. Some theoretical
research has argued that some taxation functions will imply arbitrage opportunities
and the non-existence of a competitive asset economy. In this paper we construct
a multi-period, discrete time/state general equilibrium model of asset markets with
transaction costs and taxes. The transaction cost technology and the tax system are
quite general, so that we can include most discrete time/state models with transac-
tion costs and taxation. We show that a competitive equilibrium exists. Our results
require careful modeling of the government budget constraints to rule out tax arbi-
trage possibilities.
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1 Introduction
There is an extensive literature addressing the role of taxation and transaction
costs in competitive ﬁnancial markets. In an earlier paper, Jin and Milne [15],
we proposed a general competitive asset economy with very general trans-
action technologies and provided suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a
competitive equilibrium . This model allowed us to consider economies with
brokers, dealers and a wide range of market constraints on trade (e.g., short2 Xing Jin and Frank Milne
sale constraints). We considered economies with convex and non-convex trans-
action technologies. In a complimentary paper, Milne and Neave [18] provide
characterizations of agent and competitive equilibria in such an economy and
demonstrate that most known discrete time/state models can be accommo-
dated as special cases.
In this paper we address another major imperfection in asset markets: tax-
ation. As pointed out by Schaefer [20] and Dammon and Green [6], there are
diﬃculties in dealing with taxes in a general equilibrium one-period setting.
To clear markets, when there are no restrictions on asset trading, relative
prices must reﬂect the after tax marginal rates of substitution of all agents
simultaneously. When tax rates diﬀer across investors, however, this condi-
tion can be impossible to achieve. Schaefer [20] and Dammon and Green [6]
give examples showing that when tax rates between investors are suﬃciently
diﬀerent, there may exist arbitrage opportunities for at least one investor:
this is inconsistent with the existence of general competitive equilibrium. The
main reason that investors can exploit tax arbitrage opportunities is that they
can inﬁnitely short sell assets, and exploit unlimited tax rebates on capital
losses. An alternative and more realistic view, which can accommodate as-
set short selling and individuals in diﬀerent tax brackets, is where potential
tax arbitrage opportunities exist, but there are realistic restrictions on their
exploitation.
Unlike Schaefer [20] and Dammon and Green [6], we will investigate a
closed model where the government is modeled explicitly, and tax rebates
are limited (ultimately) by the government budget constraint. Long before
government revenues and wealth are exhausted, sections of the tax code limit
the ability of private agents or organizations to exploit unbounded loopholes
in the tax law. For example, our modeling captures the essential features of
the current US tax code. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 has eliminated the net
capital gain deduction. Prior to this date, individuals could deduct 60 percent
of net long-term capital gains from income. A $3000 loss limitation was applied
to net long-term capital losses. Under the new rules, the capital gain deduction
is eliminated, but the $3000 loss limitation is retained. More generally, the
government can always make contingent provisions in the application of tax
laws to avoid large revenue losses from implausible (unbounded) claims. More
realistically, its revenues from wages and salaries dwarf any revenue or drains
from ﬁnancial taxes: in other words, the government cannot, and will not,
promise infeasible tax rebates to consumers and ﬁrms. We call this a No Ponzi
Game(NPG) condition. We stress that this constraint is a weak bound and
that more restrictive conditions could be introduced by appealing to detailed
tax laws or ﬁnancial regulations. These tighter constraints would not destroy
our equilibrium existence result.
Conceptually, the forms of tax on capital gains and losses are very compli-
cated to analyze because the investment strategies depend on the whole his-
tory of the investment (For example see Dammon and Spatt [7] and Dammon,
Spatt and Zhang [8]). Instead of giving concrete examples of capital gains andTaxation and Transaction Costs in a General Equilibrium Asset Economy 3
tax rebate rules, we will impose an upper bound on rebates for each investor.
The bound can be regarded as being exogenously determined by government
and legal considerations. Realistically it will be far less than the bound that
would exhaust government resources.
Rather than considering bounds on short positions, the upper bound on
rebates is the ﬁrst friction in the present paper and is an asymmetric treat-
ment of taxes on long and short positions. If the asymmetry is suﬃciently
pronounced to eliminate arbitrage opportunities, the only motivation for in-
dividuals to take short positions is to construct a proﬁle of portfolio cash
ﬂows which is not feasible with entirely nonnegative portfolio weights. How-
ever, when there is a large number of securities, and tax asymmetries have
eliminated arbitrage opportunities, individuals may have little motivation to
take short positions. Consequently prices may be similar to those which would
result if short sales were explicitly disallowed.
The second friction considered in this paper is transaction costs. Eﬀectively
we have extended our earlier paper (Jin and Milne [15]) on transaction costs
to include taxation. This means short-sales have additional costs over and
above taxation asymmetries, and is consistent with the discussion of Allen
and Gale [1]. In this paper, we do not impose any constraints on short-selling,
and short-sales are determined endogenously. Limited tax rebates on capital
losses and transaction costs are suggested as possible explanations for the lack
of apparent arbitrage and why a general competitive equilibrium can exist.
Another diﬃcult issue is to construct a model which is suﬃciently gen-
eral to deal with the complexities of the tax law, and yet remain tractable.
There are many papers that consider the implications for asset prices or as-
set allocations in specialized models (for a small sample see: Constantinides
[4], Dammon and Green [6], Dammon and Spatt [7], Dammon, Spatt and
Zhang [8], Dybvig and Ross [12], Ross [19], Green [14], Zechner [22]). Before
discussing the properties of an equilibrium, it is important that there are suf-
ﬁcient restrictions imposed on the economy to imply the existence of an equi-
librium. As we indicated above, if agents face agent speciﬁc tax functions that
allow tax arbitrage possibilities, then an equilibrium may not exist. This issue
has been addressed in a two period exchange economy by Dammon and Green
[6] and Jones and Milne [16]. Dammon and Green [6] consider restrictions on
tax functions to eliminate arbitrage and deﬁne a set of arbitrage-free asset
prices. Their paper considered tax functions of considerable generality and
exploited the theory of recession (asymptotic) cones to determine arbitrage
free prices. Jones and Milne [16] argued that Dammon and Green [6] did not
include the government sector explicitly, ignoring the feasibility constraints
implicit in the government budget constraint. Once these constraints were
introduced and recognized by the agents, there were natural bounds on the
possible asset trades consistent with tax arbitrage. These restrictions allowed
more general and complex tax functions to be consistent with equilibrium. Of
course the diﬀerences in the two models could be resolved by assuming that
Dammon and Green’s tax functions included the implicit tax rules that come4 Xing Jin and Frank Milne
into play as soon as large tax arbitrages were claimed from the government
by consumers. In that sense the two models could be made consistent.
The models in Dammon and Green [6] and Jones and Milne [16] were two-
period exchange economies. In this paper we extend the two-period model
to a more general multi-period economy with an explicit government sector,
productive ﬁrms, brokers/dealers who operate the costly transaction technol-
ogy, and spot commodity markets. The aim of the paper is to show how the
ideas of earlier, simpler models can be extended in a number of realistic direc-
tions. In particular the introduction of ﬁrms allows us to accommodate mod-
els (see Zechner [22], Swoboda and Zechner [21], Graham [13] for a sample)
that discuss the interaction of personal and corporate taxation, the trade-oﬀ
between corporate equity and debt taxation, and their impact on corporate
ﬁnancial structure. The introduction of government is more general than the
modeling in Jones and Milne [16] in that we allow the government to choose
commodity trades optimally given its net tax revenues. We show that the in-
troduction of spot commodity markets is easily accommodated, although we
exclude commodity and wage income taxation for simplicity. We allow gen-
eral tax functions on asset capital gains and dividends that can accommodate
most properties of tax codes on ﬁnancial assets. For example: the tax func-
tions can be non-linear, convex or piece-wise linear; they can depend upon
dynamic asset strategies so that capital gains or other complex tax systems
can be incorporated; the tax functions can include ﬁnancial subsidies as well
as taxes; and the state contingent taxation functions can be interpreted to
include (random) legal interpretations of the tax code where a dynamic asset
position is deemed to violate the code and subsequent income or capital gains
are taxed at a higher rate with possible penalties. In the body of the paper
we rule out non-convex tax functions due to subsidy/tax thresholds- later in
the paper, we discuss how this (and other extensions) could be incorporated
in a more extensive model.
The model can be used as a basic structure to discuss incomplete asset
markets and government policies to use the tax code and subsidies to complete
asset markets, or at least improve the welfare of some agents.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set out
the model and present fundamental assumptions; Section 3 is devoted to the
proof of the main theorem; in Section 4 we discuss extensions or variations
of the model and how they could be incorporated in an extended or modiﬁed
version of the model. Also we discuss equilibrium eﬃciency properties and the
complexity of general characterizations of an equilibrium.
2 The Economic Setting
Consider an economy with uncertainty characterized by a event tree such
as that depicted in Fig.1 of Duﬃe [11]. This tree consists of a ﬁnite set of
nodes E and directed arcs A ⊂ E × E, such that (E,A) forms a tree with aTaxation and Transaction Costs in a General Equilibrium Asset Economy 5
distinguished root e0. The number of immediate successor nodes of any e ∈ E
is denoted #e. A node e ∈ E is terminal if it has no successor node. Let T
denote the set of all terminal nodes. The immediate successor nodes of any
non-terminal node e ∈ E are labeled e+1,...,e+K, where K = #e. The sub-
tree with root e is denoted E(e). Particularly, E = E(e0). Suppose there are
|E| nodes(including e0)in the tree, N securities and M commodities at any
node e ∈ E0 = E − T.This assumption can be relaxed by assuming that the
numbers of securities can vary across nodes because we will not require every
asset to be held by agents at node e0. This relaxation covers the case where
some securities are issued and some mature in interim periods. For the sake of
simplicity, we assume that there is only one commodity at each terminal node
(this is largely for expositional convenience and avoids some minor technical
issues). At each node, all securities ﬁrst distribute dividends, and then are
available for trading: that is, all security prices are ex-dividend.
Let pC(e) = (pC
1 (e),...,pC
M(e)) denote the spot price of commodities at
node e ∈ E0. At each node e ∈ E0, asset n(n = 1,···,N) has a buying price
pB
n(e) and a selling price pS
n(e) and a dividend pC
1 (e)Dn(e), where we take the
ﬁrst commodity as numeraire. Moreover, let Dn(e) be the dividend of asset n





N(e)) and p(e) = (pB(e),pS(e)) and D(e) = (D1(e),···,DN(e)).
And it is assumed that dividends are always non-negative.
2.1 Intermediaries
Suppose that there are H brokers or intermediaries (indexed by h) with an
objective (utility) function UB
h (·) deﬁned over the non-negative orthant, and
commodity endowment vector ωB
h (e) at each node e. They are intermediaries
specializing in the transaction technology that transforms bought and sold
assets. Let φB
h,n(e)(φS
h,n(e)) be the number of bought(sold) asset n supplied
by intermediary h at node e ∈ E0 (denote φB






h,N(e))T, where T is the transpose transforma-
tion) and zh(e) = (zh,1(e),···,zh,M(e))T be the vector of contingent com-
modities used up in the activity of intermediation at node e ∈ E0. Then
the broker pays tax on capital gains via a general tax function TBC
h (e) =
TBC
h (e)((pB(e0),pS(e0),φh(e0))e0∈PA(e)), where PA(e) is a path from e0 to e;
and pays tax on dividends via a general tax function
TBD





h (e0) − φS
h(e0))])





h (e0) − φS
h(e0))]
and pays tax via a general tax function6 Xing Jin and Frank Milne
TBD





h (e0) − φS
h(e0))]).
Denote zh = (...,zh(e),...)e∈E0 ∈ R
|E
0|×M
+ and the portfolio plan by









h (e0) − TBC
h (e0)
+p(e0)(ωB









h (e0) − φS
h(e0))]
−TBC
h (e) − TBD
h (e) + p(e)(ωB





h (e0) − φS
h(e0))] − TBD
h (e))e∈T)
For intermediary h, let T(h,e) ⊆ RN
+×RN
+×RM denote his/her technology
at node e.







h (˜ p) is the space of feasible trade-production plans (φh,zh) =
(φB
h ,φS
h,zh) given ˜ p = (pB,pS,pC), which satisﬁes:
(2.1)(φB
h (e),φS









h (e) + pC(e)(ωB













h (e0) − φS
h(e0)] − TBD
h (e) ≥ 0,∀e ∈ T.
(2.4)γh ≥ 0.
Comments: The intermediary formulation allows the agent to trade on
his/her own account; or by interpreting the transaction technology more nar-
rowly, it can be restricted to a pure broker with direct pass through of assets
bought and sold(see Milne and Neave [18] for further discussion). Note: our
tax functions are suﬃciently general in formulation that our capital gains tax
function could incorporate dividend taxes as well (apart from the ﬁnal date).Taxation and Transaction Costs in a General Equilibrium Asset Economy 7
2.2 Firms
Suppose there are J ﬁrms. At node e0, the ﬁrm j ∈ J = {1,...,J} has
an initial endowment ωF
j (e0), which gives the ﬁrm a positive cash ﬂow.
The ﬁrm chooses an input plan y
−
j (e0) ∈ RM
+ and a trading strategy
βj(e0) = (βB
j (e0),βS






+ , where βB
j,n(e0)(βS
j,n(e0)) represents the purchase(sale) of asset n by ﬁrm
j at node e0. Then, the ﬁrm pays tax according to the tax function TF
j (e0).
At every node e(∈ E0) other than node e0, the ﬁrm produce an output
y
+
j (e) ∈ RM






j (e0) − βS
j (e0))],
then, chooses an input plan y
−
j (e) ∈ RM
+ and a trading strategy βj(e) =
(βB
j (e),βS







j (e) and TFD
j (e) on capital gains and ordinary income. It is assumed
(y
+
j (e) − yj(e)) ∈ Yj(e) ⊆ RM,where Yj(e) is a production set. At each
terminal node e, the ﬁrm j produces y
+
j (e) ∈ RM




j (e0) − y
−
j (e0)) + pS(e0)βS
j (e0) − pB(e0)βB




j (e) − y
−
j (e)) + pS(e)βS







i (e0) − βS
i (e0))] − TFD
j (e) − TFC
j (e),









i (e0) − βS
i (e0))] − TFD
j (e),
e ∈ T.






j (˜ p) is the feasible set of production-portfolio plan of ﬁrm j given ˜ p,
which satisﬁes:
δj(e) ≥ 0,e ∈ E.8 Xing Jin and Frank Milne
Remark:The modeling of the objective of the ﬁrm avoids the failure of
proﬁt to be well-deﬁned, and the non-applicability of the Fisher Separation
Theorem. We can think of the ﬁrm being either a sole proprietorship or that
the utility function is derived from some group preference arrangement (for
a more detailed discussion of these issues see Kelsey and Milne [17]). The
utility function can incorporate a number of interpretations: for example, it
could include job perquisite consumption by a manager, where her optimal
perquisite consumption is endogenously determined in equilibrium.
2.3 Consumers
In addition to broker/intermediaries and ﬁrms, there are I consumers, in-
dexed by i ∈ I = {1,...,I}. The consumer i has endowment ωC
i (e) of com-
modity at any node e ∈ E. At any node e ∈ E0, the consumer i has a con-
sumption xi(e) = (xi,1(e),...,xi,M(e))T ∈ RM
+ and chooses an asset portfolio
αi(e) = (αB
i (e),αS








i,n(e)) represents the purchase(sale) of asset n by consumer i
at node e. The consumer pays capital gains tax via a tax function
TCC
i (e)((pB(e0),pS(e0),αi(e0))e0∈PA(e))
and dividend taxes via a function deﬁned similarly to the broker tax function,
TCD





i (e0) − αS
i (e0))]
and pays tax via a general tax function TCD
i (e), and then consumes. We




|E0| denote the number of nodes in the set E0) and portfolio plan by αi =
(αi(e))e∈E0 = (αB
i (e),αS




The consumer i has a consumption set Xi ⊆ R
E
0×M
+ and a utility function
UC





i (e0) − αS
i (e0))] − TCD
i (e)
at terminal nodes. Denote
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i (˜ p,γ,δ) is the feasible set of portfolio-consumption plan of consumer i given
(˜ p,γ,δ), which satisﬁes:
pC(e)xi(e) + pB(e)αB
i (e) − pS(e)αS
i (e) + TCC
i (e) + TCD
i (e)



















i (e0) − αS
i (e0))] − TCD
i (e) ≥ 0.∀e ∈ T
where ηi,j is the share of the proﬁt of jth producer owned by the ith consumer.
The numbers ηi,j are positive or zero, and for every j,
PI
i=1 ηi,j = 1. The
numbers θi,h have the same explanation.
2.4 Government
The government is also included as part of the economy. Rather than pro-
viding a detailed analysis of the operations of the government, we will place
weak restrictions on government activity. For simplicity assume that the gov-
ernment has net resources ωG(e) ∈ RM
+ at node e, sets tax rates ex ante,
and then consumes xG(e) at node e. The government can always propose pre-
committed tax laws that avoid government bankruptcy due to errors or subtle
legal interpretations; and its revenues from taxes on wages and salaries dwarfs
any revenue or drains from ﬁnancial taxes. In other words, the government
cannot promise infeasible tax rebates to consumers and ﬁrms. We call this a
No Ponzi Game(NPG) condition3. We stress that this constraint is a weak
bound and that more restrictive conditions could be introduced by appealing
to detailed tax laws or ﬁnancial regulations.




+ , represented by a utility function UG (this is simplistic but
avoids more complex issues of government decision-making). At node e ∈ E0,
it spends its income, which comes from its endowment ωG(e) and tax revenue
3The No Ponzi Game condition has been introduced in macroeconomic models
to eliminate unbounded borrowing positions by consumers and/or governments(see
















i (e) + TCD
i (e)).





where ΓG denote the set of government’s consumption xG which satisﬁes
pC(e)xG(e) ≤ pC(e)ωG(e) + T(e)
2.5 Competitive Equilibrium and Assumptions
To conclude the section, we give the deﬁnition of a competitive equilibrium
and assumptions made throughout the remainder of this paper.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A competitive equilibrium with asset taxation and trans-
action costs is a non-negative vector of prices ˜ p∗ = (p∗C,p∗B,p∗S) and allo-
cations {(x∗
i,α∗
i) for all i ∈ I;(z∗
h,φ∗
h) for all h ∈ H;(y∗
j,β∗





h) solves the broker problem for each h ∈ H;
(ii) (y∗
j,β∗
j) solves the ﬁrm’s problem for each j ∈ J;
(iii)(x∗
i,α∗
i) the consumer problem for each i ∈ J;
(iv)x∗





































































Notice that condition (vi) allows for the extreme case where the transaction
technology is costless.
The following assumptions are made in the remainder of this paper.
For consumer i:





i is a continuous, concave and strictly increasing function;
(A3) TCC
i and TCD
i are continuous, convex functions and there ex-
ist positive constants cCC
i (e) < 1, cCD




i (e)[x] ≤ cCD
i (e)x,for any x ≥ 0, that is, the taxes can never
be larger than revenues;
(A4)We assume that the tax rebates on capital losses and ordinary income
on long and short positions have lower bounds: that is, TCC
i (e) + TCD
i (e) >
αC
i (e), where αC
i is determined by the government;Taxation and Transaction Costs in a General Equilibrium Asset Economy 11
(A5) ωC
i (e) > 0, 4∀e ∈ E0;
For broker h :
(A6)For each e, T(h,e) is a closed and convex set with 0 ∈ T(h,e);
(A7)For any e and given x = (x1,···,x2N,z1,···,zM) ∈ T(h,e), if y = P2N
n=1 xn −→ ∞, then |(z1,···,zM)| =
PM
m=1 zm −→ ∞;
(A8)For each e, if (ψ,z) ∈ T(h,e) and z0 ≥ z, then (ψ,z0) ∈ T(h,e)(free
disposal).
(A9)UB
h (·) is a continuous, concave and strictly increasing function;
(A10) ωB
h (e) > 0,∀e ∈ E0.
(A11) TBC
h and TBD
h satisfy assumption (A3) and (A4) for some cBC
h (e),
cBD
h (e) and αB
h (e).
For ﬁrm j:
(A12)For each e ∈ E0, Yj(e) is a closed and convex set ;
(A13)For each e ∈ E0, Yj(e) ∩ R 2M
+ = {0};
(A14)For each e ∈ E0, (
P
j Yj(e)) ∩ (−
P
j Yj(e)) = {0};
(A15)UF
j (·) is a continuous, concave and strictly increasing function;
(A16) ωF
j (e0) > 0;
(A17) TFC
j and TFD
j satisﬁes assumption (A3) and (A4) for some
cFC
j (e),cFD
j (e) and αF
j (e).
For government;
(A18) UG is a continuous, concave and strictly increasing function;
(A19) ωG(e) > 0;
(A20) For each security and any e ∈ E0 there exists a terminal node










h (e) ≥ 0,∀e ∈ E0
.
All assumptions except (A7), (A15), (A4), (A11), (A17) and (A21) are
standard. (A7) says that transactions must consume resources. Assumptions
(A4), (A11), (A17) and (A21) say that the government has designed into the
tax code, and in the application of tax laws, measures that avoid large revenue
losses from implausible (unbounded) claims. In other words, the government
cannot/will not promise infeasible tax rebates to consumers and ﬁrms, pre-
venting consumers from exploiting unlimited arbitrage opportunities through
tax rebates on capital losses. According to the Federal Tax Code, the govern-
ment often recognizes realized capital gains and does not recognize realized
capital losses. Observe that the tax functions and trading restrictions are
suﬃciently general to allow the government to Levy taxes on capital gains,
interest and dividends, and delay paying tax rebates on capital losses. Also
the tax functions are state contingent allowing for random audits or (random
4For x = (x1,...,xn) ∈ R
n,x  0 means xi > 0,i = 1,..,n; x > 0 means
xi ≥ 0,i = 1,..,n but xi0 > 0 for at least one i0.12 Xing Jin and Frank Milne
from the point of view of agents and the government) legal interpretations.
Strictly speaking, a fully rational system would model the intricacies of the
legal tax system - here we simply assume that is an exogenous mechanism
that is precommitted by the government.
3 The Competitive Equilibrium Existence Theorem
The main theorem of this paper is as follows:
Theorem 3.1: Suppose that the Assumptions 1-21 hold. Then there exists
an equilibrium (ξ∗, e p∗): that is, (ξ∗, e p∗) satisﬁes (i) − (vi) of Deﬁnition 2.1,








3.1 The Modiﬁed Economy
To show the existence of equilibrium, as in Arrow and Debreu [2], or Debreu
[9], we will construct a bounded commodity spot market. Unfortunately this
method does not apply directly because of the possible emptiness of the budget
correspondence of agents in a multi-period assets market. To overcome this
problem we will approximate the original economy with a sequence of new
economies with positive commodity prices which has the property that the
limit of the equilibria of the new economies is an equilibrium of the original
economy. In the following, we will ﬁrst truncate the commodity spot market
as in Arrow and Debreu [2] and then truncate the asset space.
First of all, we truncate the commodity space. For broker h, deﬁne





T(h,e), ∀e ∈ E0}
b Zh = {zh ∈ Zh : there exist xi ∈ Xi,i = 1,...,I,yj ∈ Yj,j = 1,...,J,zh0 ∈






















h (e)  0,∀e ∈ E0}.
For consumer i, deﬁne
b Xi = {xi ∈ Xi : there exist xi0 ∈ Xi0,i0 6= i,yj ∈ Yj,j = 1,...,J,zh ∈






















h (e)  0,∀e ∈ E0}.
For ﬁrm j, set
b Yj = {yj ∈ Yj : there exist xi ∈ Xi,i = 1,...,I,yj0 ∈ Yj0,j0 6= j,zh ∈






















h (e)  0,∀e ∈ E0}.
For the government, set
ˆ XG = {xG ∈ XG : there exist xi ∈ Xi,i = 1,...,I,yj ∈ Yj,j =






















h (e) 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As in Arrow and Debreu [2], we have the boundedness of sets b Xi, b Yj,b Zh
and ˆ XG, which is stated in the following lemma. The proof is omitted because
it is standard.
Lemma 3.1. The sets b Xi, b Yj,b Zh and ˆ XG are all convex and compact.
Now we turn to truncating trading sets of asset. For broker h, deﬁne
Φh = {φh = (φB
h ,φS
h) : there exists zh ∈ b Zh such that (φh(e),zh(e)) ∈
T(h,e),∀e ∈ E0}.
In the following lemma, Φh will be shown to be bounded, which will play
an important role in proving the existence of the general equilibrium.
Lemma 3.2. The set Φh is a compact and convex subset of R|E
0|×N,
h = 1,...,H.
Proof: If the assumption (A6) holds, then the set Φh is a closed con-
vex set. The convexity of Φh is obvious. It remains to show its closed-
ness. To this end, suppose that for each k, there exists φ
(k)
h ∈ Φh and
zk
h ∈ b Zh such that (φ
(k)
h ,zk




h) ∈ T(h,e),∀e ∈ E0, where zk





h } is unbounded, we may suppose (φ(k))B
h,1 −→ ∞ without loss of gen-
erality. .





which provides a contradiction since b Zh is bounded by Lemma 3.1 and proves
the boundedness of {φ
(k)











this implies, by closedness of T(h,e), that Φh is compact.
By Lemma 3.2, there exists a positive constant M0 such that for any
(φB
h ,φS
h) ∈ Φh, φB
h,n(e) ≤ M0 and φS
h,n(e) ≤ M0,n = 1,..,N,h = 1,...,H,
∀e ∈ E0.
For consumer i, deﬁne
b Ψi = {αi = (αB
i ,αS
i ) : αB
i,n(e) ≤ HM0,n = 1,..,N,∀e ∈ E0}.
For ﬁrm j, deﬁne
b Θj = {βj = (βB
j ,βS
j ) : βB
j,n(e) ≤ HM0,n = 1,..,N,∀e ∈ E0}.
Deﬁne
C1 = {(c1,...,c2(|E0|×N)) : |ci| ≤ M1,i = 1,...,2(|E0| × N)}(⊆ R
2(|E
0|×N)
+ )14 Xing Jin and Frank Milne
where M1 > HM0.
Set b X0


































for some xi0 ∈ Xi0,i0 6= i,yj ∈ Yj,j = 1,...,J,zh ∈ Zh,h = 1,..,H and
xG ∈ XG. Here
M1(e0) = (3M1,...,3M1).
Likewise, we can deﬁne b Y0
j,b Z0
h and b X0
G . Like Lemma 3.1, it can be shown that
b X0
i , b Y0
j,b Z0
h and ˆ X0
G are compact and convex and therefore, there exists a cube
C2 = {(c1,...,c|E0|×M) : |ci| ≤ M2,i = 1,...,|E0| × M}(⊆ R|E
0|×M) such that
C2 contains in its interior all sets b X0
i, b Y0
j,b Z0
h and b X0
G. Deﬁne e Xi = C2 ∩ Xi
, e XG = C2 ∩ XG, e Yj = C2 ∩ Yj, e Zh = C2 ∩ Zh and e Φh = e Ψi = e Θj = C1.
And let ˜ ΓC
i (˜ p,γ,δ), ˜ ΓF
j (˜ p), ˜ ΓB
h (˜ p) and ˜ ΓG be the resultant modiﬁcation of
ΓC
i (˜ p,γ,δ), ΓF
j (˜ p),ΓB
h (˜ p) and ΓG respectively. Deﬁne 5













m(e) ≥ 0,m = 1,...,M,n = 1,..,N,∀e ∈ E0}
and
4k = {˜ p = (pC,pB,pS) ∈ 4 : pC
m(e) ≥ 1/k,
m = 1,···,M,∀e ∈ E0},
where k ≥ M.
In the next section, we will prove the existence of the modiﬁed economy
and then prove the existence of equilibrium of the original economy.
3.2 The Proof of Existence of General Equilibrium
We will adopt the Arrow-Debreu technique to prove existence in the modiﬁed
economy.
5 In this model excess demand is not necessarily homogeneous of degree zero
in prices: thus the equilibrium prices may depend on the normalization chosen. For
example, this will be the case for speciﬁc taxes.Taxation and Transaction Costs in a General Equilibrium Asset Economy 15
Given ˜ p ∈ 4k, let
µC
i = µC
i (˜ p,γ,δ) = {(ψi,xi) : UC
i (xi) = sup






j (˜ p) = {(βj,yj) : UF
j (δj) = sup
(β0
j,y0







h (˜ p) = {(φh,zh) : UB
h (γh) = sup




υG = υG(˜ p) = {xG : UG(xG) = sup
¯ xG∈ ˜ ΓG
UG(¯ xG)};













































































h (e0) − φS
h(e0)])]} is maximum}
Now we make the last assumption, the Boundary Condition for govern-
ment.
(A22) If ,for ˜ p(k) = (pC(k),pB(k),pS(k)), pC
m(k) → 0 as k goes to in-
ﬁnity, then xG,m(˜ p(k)) → ∞, where xG,m(˜ p(k)) is the government’s optimal
consumption of commodity m corresponding to price ˜ p(k).
This assumption makes the plausible condition that the government can
increase its consumption of a commodity to inﬁnity when the price of that
commodity declines to zero. A suﬃcient condition to imply this, would be
to assume that the government utility function has the property that the16 Xing Jin and Frank Milne
marginal utility of its consumption goes to inﬁnity as consumption goes to
zero. Here we merely assume the condition directly.
Now we turn to the proof of the lower hemi-continuity of e ΓC
i (p,γ,δ),
˜ ΓF
j (p), ˜ ΓB
h (γh) and ˜ ΓG .
Lemma 3.3. e ΓC
i (p,γ,δ), ˜ ΓF
j (p), ˜ ΓB
h (γh) and ˜ ΓG are lower hemi-continuous
on 4k for each k and therefore, µC
i (p,γ,δ),µF
j (˜ p),µB
h (˜ p) and υG(˜ p) are upper
hemi-continuous on 4k for each k.
Proof. It suﬃces to show that the correspondences e ΓC
i (p,γ,δ), ˜ ΓF
j (p),
˜ ΓB
h (γh) and ˜ ΓG(τ) all have interior points for the given price ˜ p ∈ 4k. From
(A5) e ΓC
i (p,γ,δ) has an interior point; From (A10), e ΓB
i (p) has an interior
point; from (A16), ˜ ΓF
j (p) has an interior point since the ﬁrm can buy some
security at the initial node and sell it gradually afterwards; and from (A19)
and (A20), e ΓG has an interior point. By Berge’s Maximum Theorem and
standard methods, we can prove that the correspondences µi,µj,µh and υG
are upper hemi-continuous and convex valued.
Deﬁne


















Ψ is also upper hemi-continuous and convex valued . Under these con-
ditions, Ψ satisﬁes all the conditions of the Kakutani ﬁxed point theo-
rem. Thus there exists(x∗
i(k),α∗





j(k)), for all j ∈ J;x∗
G(k) and ˜ p∗(k) such that (ξ∗(k), ˜ p∗(k))



















































































i (k,e0) − βS∗





h (k,e0) − φS∗
h (k,e0)])]}
≤ 0,e ∈ E0 (1)
where (αB∗
i (k,e))e∈E0 = αB∗
i (k) and the other variables are deﬁned in exactly
the same manner.
Since (ξ∗(k), ˜ p∗(k)) are bounded, we may assume that the sequence
(ξ∗(k), ˜ p∗(k)) converges, say to (ξ∗, ˜ p∗). By Lemma 3.3, in order to prove
that (ξ∗, ˜ p∗) is an equilibrium of the modiﬁed economy, we should show that
pC∗
m (e) > 0,m = 1,...,M,e ∈ E0 and ξ∗ satisﬁes market clearance.
Lemma 3.4. pC∗(e)  0,pB∗(e)  0,e ∈ E0.
Proof: First of all, we prove that pC∗  0. It is obvious that for all ˜ p ∈
























































































































h (e0) − φS∗
h (e0)])]
≤ 0. (5)18 Xing Jin and Frank Milne
The last inequality follows from (2). This means that x∗
i ∈ b Xi , y∗
j ∈ b Yj,z∗
h ∈
b Zh and x∗
G ∈ ˆ XG and therefore, (φB
h ,φS
h) ∈ Φh, h = 1,...,H,(αB∗
i ,αS∗
i ) ∈
b Ψi and (βB∗
i ,βS∗
i ) ∈ b Θj. Thus, by assumption (A22), pC∗
m (e) > 0,m =
1,..,M,∀e ∈ E0, otherwise, x∗
G / ∈ ˆ XG.
Now we turn to proving pB∗(e)  0,∀e ∈ E0. To the contrary, suppose
pB∗
n (e0) = 0 for some n and some ˜ e ∈ E0. By considering the consumer i and
noticing that pC∗(e)  0,∀e ∈ E0, (αB∗
i ,αS∗
i ) 6= b Ψi, since, by assumption
(A20), the consumer can unlimitedly increase her wealth at one of terminal
node by buying asset n at the node ˜ e. Consequently, pB∗(e)  0,∀e ∈ E0.
Lemma 3.5. ξ∗ satisﬁes market clearance.
Proof: Note that from the proof of Lemma 3.4, x∗
i ∈ b Xi , y∗
j ∈ b Yj,z∗
h ∈
b Zh, x∗

















































































h (e0) − φS∗
h (e0))]}
= 0,e ∈ E0
Suppose pB∗
n (e) > pS∗





ε suﬃciently small, pS
l (e) = pS∗
l (e),l 6= n, pB
l (e) = pB∗
l (e),l = 1,..,N,pC
m(e) =
pC∗




























































j,n(e) ≤ 0,e ∈ E0. (6)
On the other hand, as in the proof of pB∗(e)  0, we can show that
if pS∗
m (e0) = 0 for some m and some e0 ∈ E0, then, by assumption (A20),
αS∗
i,n(e0) = βS∗
j,n(e0) = 0, ∀i,j, and therefore, by (6), φB∗
h,n(e0) = 0. Conse-
quently, by noticing that pC∗(e)  0,pB∗(e)  0,e ∈ E0, and combining (2),


























































n (e) = pS∗
n (e); if pB∗


























ﬁnishing the proof of Lemma 3.5.
Combining the above three lemmas, we have proved the existence of gen-
eral equilibrium in the modiﬁed economy. Consequently, in exactly the same
manner as in Arrow and Debreu [2], it can be shown that (ξ∗, ˜ p∗) is an equi-
librium of the original economy, completing the proof of Theorem 3.1.
4 Discussion
We have provided suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a competitive equi-
librium for a multiperiod asset economy with taxes and transaction costs.
The point of the paper is to show how common assumptions on taxes and
transaction costs can be incorporated into a competitive asset economy in20 Xing Jin and Frank Milne
a consistent manner. For expositional reasons we have introduced a number
of assumptions to simplify the analysis and proofs. Below we will sketch how
one could relax these assumptions in a more general model and how one could
modify the strategy of proof to deal with this added complexity.
Having proved the existence of a competitive equilibrium in this model, we
should be interested in the eﬃciency properties of the equilibrium, uniqueness
of the equilibria (if any) and characterizations of the equilibrium. We argue
that eﬃciency and uniqueness are problematic except under very strong con-
ditions. The characterization of the asset prices and portfolios can be very
complex: simple arbitrage pricing relations will occur under certain restrictive
conditions, but one must be careful to check that the taxation functions and
transaction costs are consistent with the standard results. Dynamic portfolios
with transaction costs, trading constraints and taxes will be highly sensitive
to the speciﬁcation of those functions. There are numerous simple models in
the literature, but most rely on strong assumptions to obtain analytic results,
or require numerical simulation.
4.1 Extensions and Generalizations of the Model
First, one could introduce multiple physical commodities in the ﬁnal period.
We assumed a single commodity in the last period to simplify the technical
analysis. Apart from some additional technical restrictions, the addition of
multiple commodities in the last period is a straightforward generalization.
Second, the brokers and ﬁrms have utility functions. We assumed this type
of objective because proﬁt maximization is no longer the unanimous objective
for share holders with incomplete markets or transaction costs. Similar prob-
lems arise with diﬀering taxation across ﬁrms and shareholders in multiperiod
economies. Rather than attempt to address this diﬃcult issue here, we have
avoided it by assuming utility functions for brokers and ﬁrms. There have
been attempts to discuss more abstract ﬁrm objectives - see Kelsey and Milne
[17] and their references, but we will not pursue that line of argument here.
Similar arguments can be applied to the government utility function. Clearly,
assuming a utility function is a gross simpliﬁcation of government decision
making, but it suﬃces to provide suﬃciently regular responses in the govern-
ment demands for goods and services for our existence proof, and it closes
our economy. It would be possible to introduce less regular preferences for
government - see the techniques on voting outcomes for ﬁrm decision-making
in Kelsey and Milne [17] for some possible ideas that could applied to ﬁrms
and governments. If the economy has a single physical commodity and the
government cannot trade securities then government consumption is speciﬁed
by the budget constraint and we can dispense with the government utility
function.
Third,we have assumed that the transaction technology is convex. It is well
known that transactions involve set-up costs, or non-convex technologies. In
Jin and Milne [15] we address that issue by considering approximate equilibriaTaxation and Transaction Costs in a General Equilibrium Asset Economy 21
in economies with non-convex transaction technologies (for details see Jin and
Milne [15]). Clearly these ideas could be introduced here for our transaction
technologies. Similar arguments could be applied to non-convex tax functions
that arise from tax/subsidy thresholds that induce sharp non-convexities in
tax schedules. As long as the non-convexities in these functions are not large
in comparison to the overall economy, an approximate equilibrium could be
obtained.
Fourth, we assumed that taxation over dividends and capital gains are
additively separable. This is assumed for expositional convenience. We could
have assumed that the capital gains tax function included dividend taxation
and suppressed the dividend tax function. Notice that agent’s asset demands
and supplies will depend upon buying and selling prices, their utility functions,
endowments, technology and their tax functions. This allows considerable gen-
erality in taxation law. For example our model allows for tax timing in buying
or selling assets (for more discussion and examples of this type of behavior
see Dammon, Spatt and Zhang [8]).
Fifth, although we consider the simple case of broker/intermediaries, the
model can be adapted quite easily to accommodate restrictions on consumer
and/or ﬁrm asset positions that are imposed by regulation (see Milne and
Neave [18] for either a reinterpretation of our model, or a more straightforward
modiﬁcation of the consumer model ). Thus our model could be adapted to
include discrete versions of Detemple and Murthy [10] and Cuoco and Liu [5]
on trading restrictions.
Sixth one can consider the government precommitting to a general taxa-
tion system of laws that specify contingent rates and rules depending upon
the behavior of the agents. Given that the government could compute the
equilibrium given the competitive actions of all other agents, then the gov-
ernment could simulate diﬀerent tax codes and choose among the equilibria.
The equilibria we have discussed here is merely one of that set.
Seventh, we have omitted taxation on commodities and services at each
event. It is not diﬃcult to add those taxation functions to accommodate the
interaction of ﬁnancial and income taxation and subsidies. This modiﬁcation
would be necessary to include standard economic discussions of the interaction
of the taxation and social security systems.
4.2 Eﬃciency and Uniqueness
It is well-known in the economics and ﬁnance literature, that an equilibrium
in incomplete asset markets is generically ineﬃcient. This result carries over
to the economy with transaction costs, because the incomplete market model
is simply an economy with zero or inﬁnite transaction costs on disjoint sets
of assets. There are special cases where the economy is eﬃcient: the rep-
resentative agent model is a standard example. Another case is where the
agents have identical HARA v.Neumann-Morgenstern preferences. Related to
the eﬃciency property, is the derivation of an objective function for the ﬁrm.22 Xing Jin and Frank Milne
With transaction costs and taxation there are many cases where the objective
function cannot be obtained by the Fisher Separation theorem. We have as-
sumed the existence of a ﬁrm utility function, but a more serious construction
would introduce a welfare function that weighted the utility of the controlling
agents. Or more abstractly, we could allow for an eﬃcient outcome where a
social-welfare function does not exist (see Kelsey and Milne [17]).
One strand of literature in Public Economics discusses incomplete markets
and taxation with respect to the social security system. It suggests that the
taxation system can help overcome asset market incompleteness. As the tax-
ation and asset return functions enter in the budget constraints, it is possible
to construct tax functions that would mimic the missing asset returns and
prices. It is clear that altering the taxation system will also alter the actions
of agents in equilibrium and the relative prices of assets, so that the design of
the taxation system would require very detailed information about economic
agents.
In general the equilibria for the economy will not be unique. This is well
-known in the general equilibrium literature. Often in simple models with
transaction costs and taxes, the modeler assumes HARA utilities (or identical
risk neutral preferences) to avoid the diﬃculties of non-uniqueness of equilib-
ria. These restrictive assumptions greatly simplify the model, and in extreme
cases imply a representative agent.
4.3 Characterizations of Equilibria
Our model includes the well-studied case where there are no transaction costs
and taxes. This model implies martingale pricing results and the generalized
Modigliani-Miller theorems for derivative or redundant assets. With complete
markets, any equilibrium is eﬃcient.
With transaction costs,or incomplete markets, it is well-known that one
can still derive martingale pricing results, but the martingale measure may
not be unique. This type of model is consistent with a sub-case of our model.
Similar characterizations with bounds on martingale measures can be derived
with the version of the model with diﬀerent buying and selling prices for assets.
A number of papers use this characterization to bound derivative prices in an
equilibrium (see Milne and Neave [18] for a synthesis and discussion of the
literature).
A more diﬃcult issue arises with the introduction of a new derivative se-
curity, which cannot be priced by arbitrage, and the derivation of pricing
bounds. In a two period setting, this model is identical to an Industrial Orga-
nization model with the introduction of a new commodity. The pricing of the
commodity, and related commodities, will be very sensitive to the structure of
the model and assumptions on strategic behavior by the agents. Clearly this
type of model is not nested in our model as we are restricted to an equilibrium
model and do not consider comparative equilibria or strategic behavior.Taxation and Transaction Costs in a General Equilibrium Asset Economy 23
Turning to the economy with taxation, there are a number of results that
can be nested in our model. First, the introduction of taxation introduces
distortions that destroy eﬃciency. But the purpose of government taxation
is to raise revenue to provide public goods and redistribute wealth (we could
have modiﬁed our model to allow for this extension). Second, the existence
of transaction costs,or incomplete asset markets, raises the possibility of gov-
ernment taxation acting as a proxy for the missing or inactive asset markets.
This type of argument is often used to justify social security systems to redis-
tribute wealth and to act as an implied insurance market for the poor. Third,
restricting our attention to asset pricing, it is easy to show that if taxation
does not discriminate across assets and falls only on net income after asset
trading, then the standard arbitrage pricing results continue to hold. As these
results rely on zero arbitrage proﬁts, and there is no proﬁt in trading dy-
namic portfolios, the martingale pricing results follow. Fourth, when taxation
discriminates across assets or dynamic asset portfolios, then arbitrage asset
pricing must include taxes in the marginal conditions. These results are well-
known in corporate ﬁnance when dealing with corporate leverage, or dividend
policy. In the case of capital gains taxation, characterizations will involve op-
timal stopping rules that will be very sensitive to the speciﬁcation of the tax
rules, asset price movements and the preferences and income of the agent (for
an example, see Dammon, Spatt and Zhang [8]). Fifth, although we have only
one government, it is easy to introduce other governments and their taxation
systems. This modiﬁcation would allow the model to deal with international
taxation and tax arbitrage through ﬁnancial markets.
5 Conclusion
We have constructed a model that is suﬃciently general to include most known
models of competitive asset economies with ”frictions” in asset markets. We
have omitted two important classes of frictions: the ﬁrst is price-making be-
havior where agents’ asset trades impact on prices. Clearly this would violate
our competitive assumption. The second friction involves asymmetric informa-
tion between agents. Nearly all of the latter literature is restricted to partial
equilibrium frameworks with strategic behavior, and is not consistent with
our competitive assumptions.
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